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ABSTRACT
MICHAEL V. PAULAUSKAS: A Personal Affair: Diplomatic Negotiations and the 
Portrayal of Détente in Pravda, 1972-75
(Under the direction of Donald J. Raleigh)
This thesis explores how diplomatic relations between the US and the USSR changed 
during détente, specifically concentrating on the period between the 1972 Moscow Summit 
and the enactment of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Bill.  I employ 
transcripts of diplomatic negotiations to investigate the ways that Soviet and American 
leaders used new personal relationships with their adversaries to achieve their foreign policy 
goals.  In order to gain further understanding of the Soviet leadership’s attitudes toward 
détente, I also examine how the Soviet government, through Pravda, communicated this 
new, increasingly complex diplomatic relationship to the Soviet public in a  nuanced fashion, 
with multilayered presentations of American foreign policy that included portrayals of 
individual actors and not simply impersonal groups.
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Introduction
Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin greeted the news of Richard M. 
Nixon’s 1968 election to the presidency with considerable wariness.  Dobrynin’s thoughts 
drifted to a day ten years earlier, when then Vice President Nixon visited Moscow and joined 
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in the infamous “kitchen debate,” with each leader 
extolling the virtues of his respective society.  In his memoirs, Dobrynin describes how 
Khrushchev, “infuriated by an anti-Soviet [American congressional] resolution referring to 
the ‘captive peoples’” of Eastern Europe, “took Nixon for a ride on a motor launch down the 
picturesque Moscow River” following the debate.  The ambassador recalls: 
It was a weekend, and the boat stopped at sandy beaches, where Khrushchev 
introduced  Nixon to ordinary citizens enjoying themselves in the sun.  He then would 
ask them loudly  and in a joking manner if they felt enslaved.  The answer was always a 
burst of laughter. Throughout the trip he persisted in lecturing and teasing Nixon, who 
was made quite uncomfortable by his hectoring host.1
The Soviet leadership feared that these initial contacts as well as Nixon’s personal history of 
“anti-Sovietism, anti-communism, and militarism” could lead to only “hard times for Soviet-
American relations.”2
In 1968, Pravda, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
displayed similar reservations about the new president.  During the week prior to the election, 
1
 Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962-
1987) (New York: Times Books, 1995), 197.
2
 Ibid, 196.
2in an article “President or Sheriff?,” Pravda correspondent B. Strel’nikov described how 
each of the presidential candidates was essentially the same, writing, “It is necessary to note 
that in a society of universal fear the slogan ‘law and order’ hypnotized many voters.  But not 
all.  Here today there is a very popular caricature: two Americans stand in front of portraits of 
the candidates.  One American asks another: ‘Whose blow to the head by nightstick do you 
prefer?  Vote.’”3 Two days later, correspondent V. Nekrasov mirrored these feelings: “Many 
realize that, in the final analysis, nothing is decided, nothing is determined.”4 While such 
critiques of the democratic process do not outwardly attack Nixon for his anticommunist 
past, they also do not point to an optimistic future for Soviet-American relations. This makes
Nixon and Brezhnev’s ushering in of the new era of superpower affairs known as détente, or 
“a relaxation of tensions,” every bit more remarkable.  During the Nixon and Ford 
presidencies, Soviet and American leaders met at summits in Moscow in May 1972, in the 
US in June 1973, in Moscow in June 1974, and in Vladivostok in December 1974.  Détente 
also included constant secretive “back channel” negotiations carried out by Dobrynin and Dr. 
Henry Kissinger, who served as national security advisor from 1969 to 1974 and as secretary 
of state from 1973 to 1977.  These private talks led to the first Strategic Arms Limitations 
Treaty (SALT I), signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow in 1972, and further 
negotiations resulted in a second agreement (SALT II), with the preliminary framework 
approved in Vladivostok in 1974 before Brezhnev and President Jimmy Carter signed a final 
draft in 1979.
3
 B. Strel’nikov, “Prezident ili sherif?,” Pravda, 29 October 1968, 5.
4
 V Nekrasov, “Nad chem zadumyvaetsia Amerika,” Pravda, 31 October 1968, 5.  
3Addressing the changes in diplomatic relations between the superpowers, my essay 
considers how Pravda represented this new relationship with the US during détente.5
Drawing on diplomatic documents and Soviet newspapers, I seek to answer a number of 
important questions about détente and official public culture.  First, how did Soviet and 
American diplomats on the highest levels interact during détente?  Here, I hope to provide 
insight on how the leaders used personal relationships to further their own agendas.  Also, 
how was this new, increasingly complex relationship between the superpowers 
communicated to the Soviet public by the official press? Finally, what can be learned about 
the Soviet government’s attitudes toward détente by examining their presentation of Soviet-
American relations during this time?  
My work speaks to several underdeveloped historiographies.  The first concerns Soviet 
writings on détente.  Most important to my research is Morton Schwartz’s examination of the 
scholarly literature produced by the Institute of the USA and Canada, formed by the Soviet 
government in 1967 as a think tank for issues regarding American politics, economics, and 
society.  He contends that the “interests, attitudes, expectations, influences – the underlying 
‘motive forces’ of American foreign policy – are recognized to be more differentiated than 
originally assumed” by Soviet thinkers before détente.6 Although my own research 
substantiates his point, my paper diverges from Schwartz’s work in two important ways.  
First of all, whereas Schwartz’s research provides a window into the theorizing of détente by 
5 Pravda utilizes a number of terms to refer to détente.  First, the newspaper frequently employs razriadka or 
razriadka napriazhennosti, literally “relaxation” or “relaxation of tensions.”  Pravda also uses sotrudnichestvo, 
which means “cooperation” or “collaboration,” to describe the détente-era relationship with the USA.    
6
 Morton Schwartz, Soviet Perceptions of the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 
156.
4Soviet academics as a philosophy for leadership cadres,7 I investigate how the government 
tried to communicate an increasingly complex superpower relationship to its public while 
accommodating American leaders seeking indications of Soviet policy changes in the pages 
of Pravda.  Second, while Schwartz’s sources, the monthly journal SShA (USA) and the 
books written by members of the Institute, are useful in detecting broader shifts in the 
attitudes of the academics who influenced Soviet leaders, newspapers are more helpful in 
seeking day-to-day changes in the thinking of the Soviet leadership.8
I also enter into dialogue with other authors who have addressed Soviet images of the 
other, particularly with regards to the United States.  Eric Shiraev and Vladislav Zubok 
discuss the Soviet and Russian public’s attitudes toward America as a “pendulum,” changing 
from the “mistrust and fear” promoted by the Soviet government early in the Cold War, to 
the “admiration and hope” maintained by individuals privately in the late Soviet period, “then 
back to suspiciousness and alienation” in the 1990s.9 My essay captures a unique moment in 
the swing of this pendulum, as the government, hoping to garner support at home in the wake 
of the crackdown in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the repression of dissidents, shifted from its 
previous rhetoric of “mistrust and fear” to present a more nuanced image of the US, 
grounded in both positive and negative images of US foreign policy.
7
 Ibid, 160.
8
 Other authors have performed work similar to Schwartz that is more tangentially related to my research.  
For instance, see Jong-Pyo Kim, Image-Behavior Linkage: An Analysis of Soviet Images of America and 
Détente, 1969-1978 (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1991).  While my research confirms Kim’s 
description of the image of America during détente as “a reversed U-shaped pattern,” with its peak at the 1973 
US summit (89), Kim’s focus on using the presentation of the US to predict foreign policy and his use of New 
Times, a weekly paper printed for foreign consumption, separate his work from my own.            
9
 Eric Shiraev and Vladislav Zubok, Anti-Americanism in Russia: From Stalin to Putin (New York: Palgrave, 
2000), 3.
5Finally, my work enters into debates among diplomatic historians of the Cold War 
concerning the causes of détente.  Kissinger set the tone of the discussion in his memoirs, 
focusing on issues of international balance of power and national interest and arguing that 
American negotiations with the Soviet Union and China were designed “to shape a global 
equilibrium” that “could assure stability among the major powers, and even eventual 
cooperation, in the Seventies and Eighties.”10 While Jeremi Suri does not deny that these 
international concerns played some role in the rise of détente, he also suggests that détente 
primarily “grew from a common urge for stability among leaders under attack at home.”11
Therefore, social conflicts forced the superpower governments to make peace abroad in order 
to quell dissent at home, as the waves of American protest against the Vietnam War as well 
as the growing prominence of the Soviet dissident movement and the fallout from the 1968 
military repression of Czechoslovakia’s Prague Spring brought both American and Soviet 
leaders to the conclusion that they “could no longer assume that they commanded legitimacy 
in the eyes of their citizens.”12 Stephen Gilbert examines Soviet political speeches and the 
publications of the Institute of the USA and Canada to argue that the Soviet leadership 
viewed détente as “America’s only option,” as an evident decline in the capitalist world made 
détente an offensive policy on the part of the Soviets that guaranteed the imminent victory of 
socialism.13  My essay argues that although evidence of détente as a Soviet offensive strategy
exists in Pravda, the newspaper centered its coverage on Soviet-American collaborative 
efforts toward peace, countering Gilbert’s claims.  This focus on the Soviet leadership 
10
 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 192.
11
 Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 2. 
12
 Ibid, 4. 
13
 Stephen P. Gilbert, Soviet Images of America (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1977), 46-47.
6stressing peaceful cooperation as opposed to offensive policy supports Suri’s work, as the 
Soviet government sought to use détente to strengthen its legitimacy amongst the Soviet 
populace following the turmoil of 1968 and the repression of the dissident movement.
Furthermore, while Gilbert’s work focuses on how “certain transcendent, universalist goals, 
derived from ideology” shaped Soviet foreign policy during détente,14 my investigation 
confirms the view of Robert D. English, who describes how “gradually, mutual respect and 
trust were built” between Soviet and American diplomats, with one Soviet diplomat stating 
that this occurred: “‘not only during negotiating sessions but also [in] conversations at home, 
intervals, or ‘walks in the woods.’”15 My essay expands upon this point, as personal 
connections between Soviet and American diplomats on a higher level transcended 
ideological barriers and allowed for closer US-Soviet relations and an expansion of détente.                
I employ two types of sources to examine the dynamics of détente and its presentation to 
the Soviet populace.  Each chapter of this essay begins with an analysis of the memoirs of 
key leaders as well as transcripts of diplomatic negotiations to lay out the basic issues that 
brought the Soviet leadership and the American authorities to the negotiating table and to 
establish the tone of discussions between the superpowers. These sections discuss prominent
diplomatic issues that separated and brought together the Soviet and American leadership and
examine how these leaders interacted in an unprecedented personal fashion.  Then, each 
section inspects how the Soviet leadership used Pravda to communicate its new, more 
complex vision of Soviet-American relations developed during détente.  
14
 Ibid, 19- 20. 
15 Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 149.
7I focus on Pravda in my analysis of this shift in public discourse for several reasons.  First, 
during the years of this survey, Pravda, the official organ of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, had the largest readership of any Soviet newspaper, with a circulation of about 
9 million in 1969 that rose to nearly 11 million by 1974.16 Also, as Angus Roxburgh writes, 
Pravda “is slightly more authoritative than Izvestiia,” the newspaper of the Presidium of the 
USSR Supreme Soviet, due to “the primacy of the Communist Party over the Government.”17
This distinction is particularly important in the foreign policy discussed in my work, as all 
détente negotiations with the United States were carried out by Brezhnev and the Communist 
Party.  Even as late as 1987, when Pravda’s circulation began to fall, Roxburgh describes 
Pravda as the “first violin” of the Soviet media’s “orchestra,” as “Pravda’s comment [set]
the political and ideological tone for all the other media.”18
My research strategy comprised reading issues of Pravda by targeting specific events,
including the Soviet-American summits, the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, and the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Bill, in order to examine how the presentation 
of détente shifted during and after these critical moments in history.  To ensure that there 
would be no gaps in my coverage, I scanned one week of newspapers per month during the 
Nixon and Ford administrations, making sure that I read at least one month of newspapers in 
full per every half year.  Since this essay concentrates on Pravda ’s presentation of American 
foreign policy, reports on issues such as American social injustice or worker strikes, which
received attention in Pravda, are not a central focus.  My analysis of the articles on American 
16
 Angus Roxburgh, Pravda: Inside the Soviet News Machine (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1987), 281. 
17
 Ibid, 55.  
18
 Ibid, 58.  For circulation figures for Pravda and other Soviet newspapers from 1987 through 1989, refer to 
John Murray, The Russian Press From Brezhnev to Yeltsin: Behind the Paper Curtain (Brookfield, VT: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Company, 1994), 260-62.   
8foreign policy involves scrutinizing the tone, the placement of an article within the space of a 
newspaper, and the assignment of agency for various actions.  I have taken a similar 
approach in examining political cartoons.       
A Cautious Beginning: Soviet-American Relations before the Moscow Summit
The period between Nixon’s assumption of the presidency in 1969 and the May 1972 
Moscow summit can be characterized as a cautious beginning to détente, with the leaders 
becoming acquainted with each other, negotiating some preliminary agreements, and gauging
how seriously the opposing side took the matter of nuclear limitations. According to 
Dobrynin, in his first year of office Nixon “confirmed [Soviet] apprehensions” that arose 
after his election “because there were no attempts on his part to improve relations on the 
diplomatic level. He avoided making any statements about armaments control.”  In 
Dobrynin’s opinion, Nixon later became the first US president to accept that “the nuclear 
power of the Soviet Union was as strong” as that of the US, and “he thought that there had to 
be some means of control: that there should be no political confrontation that would have 
brought about nuclear confrontation.”  Dobrynin concluded, “When Nixon came in, there 
was a combination of confrontation and apprehension on both sides, but at the same time a 
mutual desire to somehow control things.”19  Détente developed slowly, with both sides 
taking time to size up their opponents and consider their positions.  
Before Nixon’s election, Pravda’s coverage of American foreign policy was negative, 
particularly with regards to Vietnam, providing sharp criticism of President Lyndon B. 
Johnson late in his term.  For instance, a front-page article on July 7, 1968, states, “The cars 
19
 CNN Cold War Series, “Interviews: Anatoly Dobrynin,” March 1997,  
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/16/interviews/dobrynin/ (4 November 2005).
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of the president and his attendants were met in San-Salvador with columns of demonstrators, 
who were protesting against Johnson’s visit, against the aggressive policies of the USA and 
the dirty war in Vietnam.”20 Another article, discussing a meeting between Johnson and 
South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu in Honolulu, notes, “More than fifty people 
picketed the consul of the puppet president of South Vietnam Nguyen Van Thieu, who 
arrived in Honolulu for a meeting with American President Johnson.  The picketers . . . 
protested against the Pentagon’s dirty war in Vietnam.”21 Also, a political cartoon from July 
19, “‘The Floating Bridge’ of Foreign Developers,” shows a caricature of Johnson, wearing a 
cowboy hat and an inner tube with “USA” written on it, preparing to climb onto a wooden 
bridge that floats on several menacing-looking ducks.  The planks to the bridge read 
“blackmail,” “espionage,” “ideological sabotage,” “provocation,” and “slander,” and the rails 
at the end of the bridge are pointed as spears.  A swastika-tongued snake is wrapped around a 
flowery arch that passes over the center of the bridge.22 While critiques of American foreign 
policy did not always center on the character of the president, with nonpersonal entities such 
as the Pentagon, the armed forces, and capitalists regularly condemned, the coverage of the 
Johnson presidency was negative and personal, making use of his name in articles and his 
image in cartoons.  
Following Nixon’s election, the cautious attitude that characterized détente before th e May 
1972 summit finds reflection in the conflicted nature of the coverage of American foreign 
policy in Pravda.  Newspaper articles concentrating on the Vietnam War continued to 
20
 “Sal’vadortsy protestuiut,” Pravda, 7 July 1968, 1.
21
 “Vstrecha v Gonolulu,” Pravda, 20 July 1968, 5.
22
 V. Fomichev, “‘Naplavnoi most’ zamorskikh stroitelei,” Cartoon, Pravda, 19 July 1968, 4.  For a 
photograph of this cartoon, please see Appendix I, 1. 
11
portray American foreign policy negatively, similar to the late Johnson years, featuring titles 
such as “The Vietnam Aggression of the USA is Under the Fire of Criticism,”23 “The 
Dangerous Course of the Pentagon,”24 and “The Perpetrator of the suffering of Millions –
Imperialism.”25 The 1972 New Year’s Day edition of Pravda contains a section entitled
“Condemnation of the Criminal Actions of the USA,” with the articles “Retribution for 
Robbery” and “A Firm Warning.”26  These titles display the aggressive language typical of 
articles discussing American policy in Vietnam. Moreover, the articles often demand that 
US forces leave Indochina.  The article “A Resolute Condemnation,” from January 11, 1972, 
provides such a statement, citing an “insolent call to peoples” from the Ministry of Foreign 
Relations of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), “which decisively demands that 
the USA immediately cease bombardments of Laotian territory and put an end to the 
aggressive war in Indochina.”27
Early in détente, the Soviet government published similar statements condemning the 
Vietnam War in Pravda, such as its “Statement in Connection with the Continuation of the 
Aggression of the USA in Indochina,” which prominently appears on the front page next to a 
“Declaration of Peace, Security, and Cooperation in Europe” signed by leaders from the 
entire Soviet bloc.  It slams the American war effort, stating that “the actions of the USA in 
the region of the Indochinese peninsula convincingly show that Washington continues to 
serve as a headquarters not for political but for military solutions to the problems of that 
23
 “V’etnamskaia agressiia SShA pod ognem kritiki,” Pravda, 20 September 1969, 5.
24
 “Opasnyi kurs pentagona,” Pravda, 7 April 1970, 5.
25
 “Vinovnik stradii millionov – imperializm,” Pravda, 1 January 1971, 4. 
26
 “Osuzhdenie prestupnykh deistvii SShA,” Pravda, 1 January 1972, 5.
27
 “Reshitel’noe osuzhdenie,” Pravda, 11 January 1972, 1.
12
region.”  It concludes that American imperialism, the policy of Vietnamization, and 
preserving the “puppet government” of South Vietnamese leader Nguyen Van Thieu ensure 
that “the politics of the USA in Indochina are doomed to unavoidable failure!”28 Similar to 
the statement of condemnation from the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, this declaration
from the Warsaw Pact countries stresses American aggression in Indochina and the role of 
American imperialist attitudes in allowing the unjust war to continue.
Despite the intensity of these criticisms, one defining attribute that both shapes and softens 
them is the impersonal manner in which the articles discuss American foreign policy, 
differentiating this coverage from the articles targeting President Johnson personally at the 
end of his term.  For instance, in the “Statement in Connection with the Continuation of the 
Aggression of the USA in Indochina,” the guilty actors mentioned include the American 
government, Washington, South Vietnam, and Thieu.  The authors do not blame any specific 
American leaders, including Nixon, Kissinger, for the campaign.29 In another article, “The 
Forces of Progress and Peace Are Invincible,” the author writes, “New secret documents of 
the US government appeared in several organs of the American press, as an aggressive 
American policy, hostile to the liberation movements of Bangladesh and India, was 
developed in detail in the hiding places of Washington.”30  Here, while Washington and the 
government retain a portion of the blame, the author’s use of passive voice leaves the 
question of agency open ended.  
One of the few instances where reference to a particular American leader can be found in 
Pravda at this time is when the newspaper prints an interview or press conference with the 
28
 “Zaiavlenie v sviazi s prodolzheniem agressii SShA v Indokitae,” Pravda, 27 January 1972, 1.
29
 Ibid.
30
 Vitalii Korionov, “Sily progressa i mira neodolimy,” Pravda, 9 January 1972, 1-4.
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president or other American leaders.  The article “Interview with R. Nixon,” appearing on 
January 4, 1972, provides its harshest critique of the president when it states, “He was forced 
to contend with sharp criticism of the American administration’s policy in connection with 
the concentrated air raids in [North Vietnam], which caused a broad wave of indignation and 
protests in the USA and the entire world.”31  In general, Pravda reserved its most aggressive 
criticisms for non agents in the passive voice or inanimate objects, including the White 
House, the Pentagon, and Washington.  When using the names of Nixon or his advisors, the 
critiques tended to be mild, concentrating on the facts of the situation and allowing these 
officials to state their positions.   
This tendency to criticize American foreign policy in an impersonal manner during the 
early years of détente is also found in Pravda’s political cartoons.  For instance, a cartoon 
from January 26, 1972, “Diplomacy of the USA ‘At Work,’” addresses the slowness of the 
American withdrawal from Vietnam.  In the lower left-hand corner of the cartoon, a sign 
pointing along a relatively straight road reads, “The path to the settlement of the Vietnam 
conflict.”  Blocking that road, however, is a construction sign followed by a “Detour” sign 
that points along a divergent, winding path.  Behind these signs stands the stereotypical 
symbol of a capitalist, who smokes a cigar and wears a top hat, glasses, a long black tuxedo 
coat, and striped trousers.  He works in the road, using a jackhammer to destroy the path that 
would most easily lead to settlement.  Unable to follow this path of peace, American soldiers 
lie prone under some palm trees that stand along the meandering road of the detour, pointing 
their machine guns in anticipation of a battle against North Vietnamese forces.32  In this way, 
31
 “Interv’iu R. Niksona,” Pravda, 4 January 1972, 5.
32
 V. Til’man, “Diplomatiia SShA ‘za rabotoi,’” Cartoon, Pravda, 26 January 1972, 5.  See Appendix I, 2.  
This caricature represents a capitalist and not Uncle Sam for various reasons, including his black overcoat, 
14
American policy in the Third World remains under scrutiny, as American forces are delayed 
in their exit from Vietnam.  This criticism, however, is applied to the impersonal depiction of 
the capitalist and not representations of American foreign policy leaders such as Nixon or 
Kissinger.
Political cartoons reflecting this same impersonal criticism can be found discussing other 
aspects of American foreign policy.  For instance, in “Smoke Screen above Olympus,” the 
artist employs an often-used symbol of the United States military establishment: a uniformed 
man wearing a pair of dark sunglasses and a large helmet.  The caricature sits on a 
mountaintop bust of Zeus, firmly straddling the statue with his legs and gripping its hair with 
his right hand.  In his left hand, the soldier holds a battleship with smoke that is pouring from 
its smokestacks and surrounding the mountain.  A caption sitting within the smoke reads, 
“!!!Soviet threat!!!”  The caption explains: “American admirals recently have made much 
noise about the mythical ‘Soviet threat’ in the Mediterranean.  However, under the cover of 
deceitful fabrications the strategists of the Pentagon develop aggressive plans for this 
region.”33 Once again, the cartoonist attacks American policy, describing it both as 
“aggressive” and “deceitful.”  The cartoon also assigns agency for this policy to a number of 
impersonal forces, including the US military, “American admirals,” and “the Pentagon.”  
Therefore, the cartoon criticizes US foreign policy without attacking the American leaders 
who were most responsible for it.  They remained out of sight, covertly negotiating détente 
with the Soviet government.
black top hat, and the cigar in his mouth, all of which are atypical of the representation of Uncle Sam in the 
Soviet press between 1969 and 1977.   
33
 Kukryniksa, “Dymovaia zavesa nad Olimpom,” Cartoon, Pravda, 28 January 1972, 5.  See Appendix II, 3.
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The coverage of American foreign policy in Pravda reflects the apprehensive mood of
détente before the May 1972 summit, as described by diplomats such as Dobrynin.  Even as 
late as January 1972, Soviet censors continued to treat American foreign policy critically, 
targeting the war in Vietnam and other American actions in developing countries.  Be that as 
it may, the newspaper eliminated personal attacks on prominent American leaders associated 
with détente, including Nixon and Kissinger.  While Soviet skepticism of détente is displayed 
in the intense criticisms, the lack of direct attacks on officials negotiating détente with the 
Soviet government indicates that the Soviet authorities had left the door open for the 
possibility that détente between the powers would widen.
The Lifting of the Veil: The 1972 Moscow Summit
The course of détente shifted dramatically in late May 1972, when Nixon and Brezhnev 
met in Moscow for a summit meeting and signed the several agreements that make up SALT 
I, including the “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,” the “Interim 
Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms,” and “Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” Now, the veil that hid the full extent of détente was 
lifted, especially in the Soviet Union, and the fruit of the secret negotiations between the 
White House and the Kremlin was placed on public display.
On the eve of the Moscow summit, Kissinger met with Brezhnev at his private guest house 
to settle the last main points of contention that the private “back channel” negotiations 
between Kissinger and Dobrynin had not yet finalized.  The two leaders stood, overlooking 
the Moscow River, and reflected on the progress that they had made while anticipating
Nixon’s visit.  Discussing Kissinger’s most recent editing of the documents, Brezhnev noted:
“They tell me you’ve been working on the draft of the Principles and strengthening it.  That’s 
what I had suggested.  You’re a good man.  If I were you and I were an evil man, I’d have 
just kept quiet about the draft as it was.  But you are a generous man.”34 Following a 
34
 “Kissinger-Brezhnev Conversation, 22 April 1972, 11:00 AM-4:05 PM,” 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB60/abm34.pdf (20 October 2005).  
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promise to mention Kissinger favorably in a speech, Brezhnev praised the nature of “back 
channel” diplomacy and spoke positively of the future of détente: “You and I can accomplish 
much together between the two of us.  Maybe we should just abolish our Foreign Offices.”
Playing along, Kissinger assured the general secretary that the US had “already taken steps in 
that direction.”35  Even after the parties entered the house and official talks began, this banter 
persisted.  Kissinger joked about the weight he gained every time he visited the Soviet 
Union, eating copious amounts of cookies and cakes, which he referred to as the USSR’s 
“secret weapon,”36 while Brezhnev let loose  a series of long jokes to both lighten the mood 
and, occasionally, shed light on the negotiations.
Both sides initially saw the development of this sort of congenial relationship as leverage 
for receiving further concessions from the other.  On the American side, this is evident when 
Kissinger privately informs Nixon about a conversation he had with Dobrynin, when he 
angrily explained to the Soviet ambassador that the US was reinstating a bombing campaign 
of Hanoi because of the DRV’s decision to retract an agreement for a meeting.  Kissinger 
explains, “Dobrynin was in slobbering all over me,” despite the fact that he “should [have 
been] yelling and screaming” over the news that the US was “bombing the capitol and near 
the capitol of one of their close allies.”37  Here, Kissinger demonstrates an open 
understanding that each superpower attempted to massage the other party’s ego, even as the 
opposing superpower did something unfavorable.  In his memoirs, Dobrynin provides further 
insight into his decision to avoid “yelling and screaming,” noting that the Politburo “was 
35
 Ibid.
36
 Ibid.
37
 “Nixon-Kissinger Telephone Conversation, 15 April 1972, 10:25 PM,” 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB123/Box%2029,%20File%208%20Kissinger-
%20President%20April%2015%201972%2010,25%20pm%200.pdf  (5 December 2005).
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caught in a dilemma between wanting to stop the American bombing and wanting to go 
ahead with a summit meeting with the president who had ordered the attacks.”38 By acting 
calmly and playing into his personal closeness with Kissinger, Dobrynin could buy more 
time for the Politburo to consider the issue of the summit while simultaneously keeping the 
roots of a working relationship with Nixon and Kissinger on track.  Despite this mutually-
manipulative aspect of the superpower relationship, it remained unusually intimate and grew 
more earnest as time went on and the concrete settlements of the first summit ended the 
caution held by the Soviet leadership in the first years of détente.  
The developing personal relationship helped the negotiating parties deal with the one 
sticking point in the talks, as even the Vietnam War was discussed in a friendly manner.  
Noting that he “certainly support[ed] President Nixon’s idea of ending the war,” Brezhnev 
stated: “Of course, it was not President Nixon who started the war.  But of course it’s up to 
the United States to extricate itself somehow from it.”  He continued: “The U.S. will have to 
do it; whether it is President Nixon or someone else, is not for me to say, but the U.S. will 
have to do it.  That is the only way.  Otherwise, the fighting will go on.  You know their 
determination, and the support they are getting [in] public opinion throughout the world.”39
Therefore, similar to the coverage in Pravda, Brezhnev attacked the continuation of the war 
in his discussions with Kissinger while avoiding assaults directed at Nixon or other foreign 
policy leaders.  While he needed to support his Vietnamese ally, Brezhnev could not alienate 
his negotiating partners in the United States, so he did his best to encourage negotiations 
between the USA and the DRV while avoiding offending Kissinger.  Even during their 
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contentious discussions involving Vietnam, the negotiating partners worked calmly, and each 
side left the table eagerly anticipating Nixon’s visit to Moscow. While the personal 
relationship between the leaders was still in its infancy on the eve of the Moscow summit, it 
was already proving effective in helping leaders from both superpowers to regulate their 
affairs in a friendly manner, providing means for both sides to pressure each other on the 
issue of North Vietnam and for Dobrynin to delay the Politburo’s decision on the summit.
In the weeks preceding the Moscow summit, newspaper coverage of American foreign 
policy in Pravda remained critical, but impersonal.  For instance, on May 13, in an article 
“Schemes of the Pentagon Suffer Failure,” political commentator Iurii Zhukov retains the 
criticism of Vietnam seen in previous years, writing, “The Soviet people and the entire 
progressive community of the world decisively condemn the new expansion of aggressive 
actions in Vietnam undertaken by the United States.”  Moreover, this article, unlike most 
others of the period, discusses the actions of an American president: Lyndon Johnson.  
Zhukov first quotes a New York Times reporter, who writes that “Vietnamization ended in no 
less of an immense failure than the land war of Johnson.”  He later describes Operation 
Rolling Thunder, “when the Pentagon subjected the entire territory of North Vietnam to 
systematic mass bombing” and “Johnson was forced to end these operations, in the course of 
which American aviation suffered heavy losses, and go to negotiations.”  Even though the 
paper associates Johnson with the land war, the impersonal force of the Pentagon retains 
agency in beginning the former bombing campaign.  The only other American politician 
mentioned in the article is Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, who is quoted as giving the 
number of American soldiers in Vietnam to the Senate and evading the questions of a 
reporter about the role of American troops late in the war.  But no mention is made of Nixon 
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or Kissinger, leaving the primary players in negotiating détente untouched in this criticism of 
American foreign policy.40
The political cartoons in Pravda leading up to the summit, like the newspaper coverage, 
remained focused on an impersonal, negative portrayal of American foreign policy.  For 
example, in the cartoon “For the Beloved Melody, (I) Don’t Begrudge the Money,” Uncle 
Sam, in a starred vest and a cowboy hat with a gun on his belt, leans on a jukebox, dropping 
money into the machine.  The side of the jukebox reads, “Radio Liberty and Radio Free 
Europe,” and from the jukebox comes music, which forms the word “Anticommunism.”  The 
caption reads, “The government of the USA generously finances the radio stations Radio 
Liberty and Radio Free Europe, which broadcast slanderous propaganda against the Soviet 
Union and other socialist nations.”41 As in the cartoons from previous months, US foreign 
policy served as the standard target for political cartoons in Pravda in the weeks before 
Nixon’s summit, with each of the cartoons taking an impersonal approach to the critique.
After a May 17 article announced that “the government of the United States continues 
preparations for the trip of President Nixon to the Soviet Union in accordance with plans,”
Pravda’s coverage of American foreign policy changed dramatically.42 The following day, 
the article “Sober Heads” examines the growing preference among American scholars for 
foreign policy “realism,” which they describe as a commitment to negotiate with the Soviet 
Union on equal terms for the peaceful coexistence of two separate systems of government.  
The editorial concludes, “All these facts attest to the fact that in American academic circles 
the position of forces that speak in favor of the turning of the USA to a more realistic policy 
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and a more constructive approach to urgent international problems is strengthening.”43  The 
next day, the article “From the Positions of Realism” attempts to place this newfound interest 
in the positive side of American foreign policy in a historical context, declaring that “the 
improvement of relations between the USSR and the USA is possible and desirable – the 
Soviet government invariably adhered to this position from the moment of its birth.”44
Finally, in “Desire of the Majority of Americans,” another author examines American 
newspapers, news, and radio commentary, and a discussion with the vice-president of 
Caterpillar Tractor to ascertain how Americans felt about the upcoming summit in Moscow.  
He concludes:
Wide circles of the American public hope that the mutual interests of our peoples in 
solving urgent problems will gain the upper hand over the aspirations of those American 
politicians who would freeze Soviet-American relations in the trenches of the Cold War.
To remove obstacles to détente in Soviet-American relations, to search for mutually-
beneficial constructive solutions to vital problems in the interests of general peace –
such, in the opinion of many observers, is the sincere desire of the majority of the
people of the USA.45
Thus, in the days following the confirmation that Nixon would travel to Moscow for the 
summit, before the president even set foot in the country, coverage of American foreign 
policy changed dramatically, suddenly concentrating on the merits of American “realism” as 
well as on the great possibilities of improved relations between the two superpowers.
When Nixon became the first US president to visit the Soviet Union, arriving on May 22, 
the press exploded with positive coverage of American foreign policy.  First of all, Pravda
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provided the full text of all three major agreements concluded at the summit.46  The emphasis 
placed on these treaties put the talks at the fore of the world news, trumping praise for Soviet 
domestic affairs, coverage of Vietnam, and attacks on other aspects of Western foreign 
policy. Also, rather than continuing to present American foreign policy as faceless, 
newspapers suddenly made it a very personal affair.  This is most evident in the daily front-
page coverage of the summit, which the newspaper devoted to listing all of the various 
superpower meetings, including the names of all attendees of the talks as well as the
agreements that they made.  The newspaper published Nixon’s speeches next to those of 
Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders.47  This lent Nixon’s words a sense of authority and helped
to stress the existence of cooperation, with Nixon telling guests at an official lunch, “At the 
moment, as we begin to remove the burden of armed confrontation from the shoulders of our 
two peoples, let us recall that we must justify the hopes of all peoples of the world for 
peace.”48 Additionally, the press followed the movements of Nixon and his wife around the 
city, reporting their activities to the public.  For instance, Pravda devoted coverage to the 
first lady’s visit to Moscow State University, the president’s trip to the Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier in the Kremlin, where he laid a wreath, and their evening outing to the 
Bolshoi Theater, where they both attended a performance of Swan Lake, sitting with 
Brezhnev, Kissinger, and other delegates “in the central box, which was decorated with the 
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flags of the USA and the USSR.”49 Pravda coverage during the summit personified the US 
with the names of dozens of diplomats and the figurehead of President Nixon, giving 
American foreign policy a face for the first time and thereby helping to create a more positive 
representation of the US and détente.
While adding optimistic representations of Soviet-American relations through the 
inclusion of positive personalities, Pravda also dramatically changed its presentation of other 
aspects of American foreign policy by limiting criticisms of the Vietnam War and increasing 
negative coverage of other Western nations.  For instance, on the third page of the May 29 
edition of Pravda, the editors printed two clips on Vietnam under the heading “At the Front 
of Indochina.”  While the first clipping continued  to portray the war in a negative light, 
describing the South Vietnamese government as a “puppet regime” and the army as “puppet 
troops,” the US is not mentioned once.  The second clipping, on the other hand, mentions the 
United States, but in a surprisingly neutral light, simply stating, “During the air raids of the 
USA in the North Vietnamese provinces . . . units of the anti-airborne defense brought down 
two American airplanes.”50 The picture of North Vietnamese troops or suffering North 
Vietnamese civilians that normally would accompany such articles is gone, replaced by a 
photograph of British troops preparing to meet North Irish demonstrators in the streets of 
Belfast.  
Across the page from the shortened coverage of Vietnam sits a lengthy article “In the 
Interests of the People,” which summarizes press clippings from newspapers around the 
world with positive reactions to the Moscow summit.  Included is a statement from 
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Washington that “the leaders of both party factions in the American Congress came out in 
support of the agreements,” with the Senate Democratic majority leader describing the 
summit as “an important step in the right direction” and the Republican minority leader 
stating that the agreements were “the most important documents in modern history.”51  In 
sum, this page represents the changes that occurred in the coverage of American foreign 
policy in Pravda during Nixon’s visit, with outwardly negative descriptions of the American 
role in Vietnam limited, replaced by positive coverage of Soviet- American negotiations in 
Moscow and criticism of other Western powers.
The change in coverage is also reflected in the political cartoons printed in Pravda during 
Nixon’s visit.  The main topics of the cartoons shifted from criticisms of American foreign 
policy to critiques of other powers, especially England and Israel, as well as general 
condemnations of capitalism.  For instance, on May 27, Pravda printed a cartoon “The Lion
– the Arms-Bearer,” which portrays a Portuguese man in safari-hunting garb, holding a rifle 
and wearing a holstered pistol, an ammunition belt, and a flamethrower.  Behind him stands a 
lion, the symbol of Great Britain, obediently holding the hunter’s ammunition box and
grenades in its paws and additional firearms in its mouth.  The hunter, who reaches for more
cartridges in the lion’s ammunition box, stands in a pool of blood,  surrounded by the fallen 
bodies of African people and a burning hut.  This criticism of European foreign policy in 
Africa is rooted in economics, with the lion’s tail forming the sign of the pound to indicate 
the important role of capitalist concerns in the destruction of the African village.52
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In addition to shifting criticism to other Western countries, Pravda changed the focus of its 
political cartoons during the summit to include more general critiques of capitalism.  For 
instance, a May 25 cartoon entitled “Monopolist Circles and their Steps” featured a circle of 
capitalists chasing each other in a counter-clockwise fashion.  Wearing a tuxedo and a top 
hat, each capitalist carries a fork and knife and attempts to bite the foot of the smaller 
capitalist in front of him.  The smallest of the monopolists chases the largest, nipping at his 
toes.  A large bag at the center of the circle is labeled “Profits,” implying that the 
monopolists will devour each other until there is only one left, who will successfully take 
possession of the profits.53  Whereas most political cartoons before the summit attack US 
foreign policy, especially in Vietnam, political cartoons during the summit shift their focus, 
criticizing other Western nations and increasing general condemnations of capitalism.
Even though the volume of coverage on the US diminished after the summit, the shift in 
reporting on the US in a positive light continued  in the month after Nixon’s departure on 
May 30.  The first place this can be found is on a front-page spread in the June 2 edition of 
Pravda entitled “On the Conclusions of the Soviet-American Negotiations.”  While the 
article praises Soviet negotiators for remaining firm in their stance “on the question of the 
continuation of aggression of the USA in Vietnam,” it retains the praise for realism expressed 
in Pravda just before Nixon’s visit, writing that “the results of the Soviet-American 
negotiations once again demonstrated that under contemporary conditions disputed 
international questions cannot be solved from a ‘position of strength.’” The article, which 
mentions Nixon, retaining the more personal approach achieved during the summit,
concludes that the negotiations “represent a major step in the development of Soviet-
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American relations, contributing to the strengthening of the principle of the peaceful 
coexistence of states with different social systems to the cause of peace and the security of 
peoples.”54  Despite the reference to Vietnam, the majority of the article praises the 
negotiating strategies of the US and the USSR, showing the trend in the Soviet press to
continue presenting the US in a more positive light after the Moscow summit.
The Vietnam War reentered the political cartoons in Pravda, but cartoonists downplayed 
US involvement.  For instance, a June 4 cartoon “Work Placement the Saigon Way” shows 
students exiting Saigon University, dropping their books in a pile, receiving military 
equipment, and being handed a rifle with an attached diploma by a Vietnamese officer.55
Then, on June 8, Pravda printed a political cartoon “‘Combat Formation’ of the Saigon 
Warriors,” with Thieu chasing after soldiers who are running to the jungle, with the word 
“deserters” spelled on the soles of their shoes.56  Both of these cartoons criticize the Vietnam 
War, with the first discussing the loss of youth that comes with the war and the second 
arguing that South Vietnam does not have the ideological fortitude or the strength to keep its 
own soldiers in line.  Neither of these cartoons, however, attacks American involvement in 
Vietnam, signifying that the Moscow summit continued to affect the Soviet press following
Nixon’s departure.
In the months after this outpouring of positive coverage that followed the summit, 
however, Pravda formed a composite view of American foreign policy, with both negative 
and positive coverage of US foreign policy.  Pravda’s coverage indicates that this occurred 
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as the Soviet leadership’s euphoria from the conference subsided, with Nixon’s continuation 
of Operation Linebacker, the bombing campaign against the DRV, signaling that the Vietnam 
War would not end in the near future.  For example, on October 12, Pravda discussed the 
approval of the military budget for the financial year in a negative and impersonal manner, 
describing the Vietnam War as “the aggressive war in Indochina” and noting “the fact that 
the enormous sum of defense expenditure approved by the Congressmen comprises the lion’s 
share of the federal budget of the country.”57 Paralleling the articles prior to Nixon’s visit, 
these place emphasis on impersonal forces playing a negative role in American foreign 
policy, as the article mentions Congress and the Pentagon but not specific politicians.  An 
accompanying political cartoon features American involvement in Vietnam, “Receive School 
Work/Mission.”  In this cartoon, an American officer shows his pilots a map, which is 
marked with the location of North Vietnamese schools.  The caption, quoting the North 
Vietnamese Minister of Education, reports that beginning in April, “American aviation 
attacked . . . more than 150 schools.”58  Both the article and cartoon witness the  revival of the 
negative depiction of the role of the United States in Vietnam that occurred in the months 
prior to Nixon’s visit.  They portray the US government impersonally and as senselessly 
aggressive, spending the majority of its national budget on the war and even bombing 
schools.
Despite the return of such negative coverage of American policy in Indochina, Pravda’s 
positive outlook on Soviet-American cooperation and détente retained a prominent role in 
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subsequent months.  On October 4, a Pravda article describes the White House ceremony 
that commemorated the ratification of the SALT agreements negotiated at the Moscow 
summit.  The article quotes both Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Nixon, 
stressing the importance of the agreements in helping to create a safer and more peaceful 
world.  According to the article, “Nixon indicated that the documents, signed this year in the 
Kremlin, arouse all of humanity’s hopes for the accomplishment of his dream of peace on 
Earth” and for the building of a new world order where “the peoples, having different 
governments and adhering to different world views, could live in the world together.”59
Here, the personal and positive views of the US evident during the Moscow summit are 
repeated, complete with quotations from both Gromyko and Nixon about the possibilities for 
cooperation between the USSR and the USA and for peace on Earth.  
An article on April 6, 1973, entitled “Expansion of Cultural Ties,” reflects the positive 
coverage, highlighting the different Soviet artists and performers presenting work in the US 
in 1973.  These included the “Treasures of Soviet Museums” exhibit that arrived in New 
York and the collection of paintings from the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art that 
simultaneously opened in the Soviet Union.  After discussing upcoming visits by  the Bolshoi 
Theatre and the Leningrad Philharmonic Orchestra, the author notes that in one day, 30,000 
people visited the art exhibit in New York.  The article concludes, “All this serves as an
expression of the attitude of Americans to those key problems that now concern the entire 
world, and, above all, to the problems of the normalization of relations between the USSR 
and the USA.”60 Stressing the growing connections between the Soviet and American 
59
 “Soglasheniia vstupili v silu,” Pravda, 4 October 1972, 4.
60
 “Rasshiriaiutsia kul’turnye sviazi,” Pravda, 6 April 1973, 5.
29
people, the article states that the attendance numbers at the exhibit demonstrate the 
commitment of Americans to détente and friendly relations with the USSR.
In sum, Nixon’s visit to Moscow in May 1972 brought about dramatic changes in the 
Soviet representation of American foreign policy.  During the Moscow summit, Pravda
provided a positive view of American foreign policy, virtually ignoring American 
participation in Vietnam, adding positive and personal depictions of American foreign policy 
leaders to the articles, and stressing the progress in world peace and security achieved 
through the negotiations.  After time, however, a composite view emerged, with the 
persistence of Operation Linebacker prompting the return of the impersonal, negative 
portrayal of American foreign policy in Vietnam and the continuation of the personal, 
positive portrayal in détente. Thus, the impersonal, negative imagery resulting from the 
Soviet government’s distaste for the ongoing war merged with its personal, positive support 
of détente to produce a two-tiered official public discourse with regards to American foreign 
policy.
The High-Water Mark of Détente: The 1973 US Summit
The strengthening of the relationship between Soviet and American leaders that occurred 
as a result of the Moscow summit is evident in diplomatic exchanges between the parties as 
the US summit approached in June 1973.  The United States and the North Vietnamese 
governments came to an agreement for the withdrawal of American forces in January 1973, 
removing a major thorn in the side of Soviet-American relations.  On May 25, 1973, Soviet 
Ambassador Dobrynin called Kissinger to arrange a meeting to discuss plans for Brezhnev’s
visit to the US between June 17 and June 25.  Dobrynin, in a humorous mood, brought up 
Kissinger’s infamous love life.  After Kissinger stated that he had “been a little tired” the day 
before, Dobrynin sought an explanation, noting that he heard that the National Security 
Advisor was “sitting with a very nice girl” whose picture he had “on this Playboy Calendar.”  
After Kissinger responded, “Oh-h-h-h-h, you’re a dirty old man,” Dobrynin stated, “Oh, 
come on, come on. . . . She’s a real nice girl.  I don’t know how she looks now but at that 
time— ”  Kissinger interrupted, asserting that “she’s very attractive” and exclaiming, “I hope 
she isn’t a nice girl.”  Dobrynin conclude d this personal exchange, stating: “You were with 
her, I wasn’t.  So you are an authority, not me.”61
Despite this jocular banter, the assessment of Brezhnev’s trip to the US differs in the 
memoirs of its participants.  Although Kissinger reveals his belief that “Brezhnev was 
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sincerely prepared for a prolonged period of stability,” he stresses that “the impact of the 
1973 summit was almost certainly unfortunate – not for foreign policy reasons but because of 
the dramatic demonstration of America’s internal disarray” during the Watergate scandal.  
Kissinger concludes that while this show of domestic disorder would not tempt the Soviets to 
undertake “adventures staking Soviet assets,” it “undoubtedly made them less willing to 
expend capital on preventing adventures by friendly nations,” particularly in the Middle East, 
where war would erupt in October.62  Dobrynin, on the other hand, asserts that the summit 
“served to advance the process of improving Soviet-American relations that was set in 
motion by Nixon’s first presidential visit to Moscow,” with both leaders “sincerely prepared 
for an extensive period of stability and further cooperation.”  Moreover, “personal relations” 
between Nixon and Brezhnev “were consolidating,” and while “the Soviet government began 
to understand [Nixon’s] serious difficulties,” they “still believed that he would overcome 
them, and that the process of consolidating [Soviet-American] relations would develop 
further.”63
With such conflicting reports on the results of the summit, it is important to look to how 
these relations served the actors in a heated moment in order to assess how Brezhnev’s visit 
to the US affected the status of détente.  Four months after the summit, during the October
War of 1973, the Israeli Army was in the process of pushing back Egyptian and Syrian forces 
when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat asked Brezhnev for support.  The United States 
demanded that the USSR not send forces, told the Israeli government to stop its advance, and 
placed its nuclear forces on high alert.  Whether or not the Soviet government would 
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intervene unilaterally against Israel was unclear, and while the US attempted to quiet the 
situation, the rise in nuclear alert status created additional friction between the superpowers, 
as Soviet authorities viewed this maneuver, which came without warning, as a sign of 
American unilateralism and adventurism.64 With tensions at a high, Kissinger tried to 
reassure Dobrynin, discussing the importance of preserving détente: “Now the important 
thing is for you and us to stay together having made this historic achievement. . . . We’ve got 
to stay together for the peace settlement.  That is the most important thing.”65  Two days 
later, Dobrynin emphasized these same feelings to White House Chief-of-Staff General 
Alexander Haig: “It is very important to keep the personal relationship as strong as it was 
before. . . . It is very important now to keep really everything as much as possible intact.”66
As Dobrynin concludes in his memoirs, “The Middle East War never grew into a direct 
military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States – in contrast to the 
Cuban crisis – precisely because of the remarkable new level of Soviet-American 
relations.”67 Indeed, while both sides had the incentive of avoiding nuclear war to motivate 
them to negotiate, the personal relationship between Soviet and American leaders, solidified 
during the US summit, served as a tool for these leaders to make the personal appeals that 
helped to ease tensions and defuse the situation in the Middle East.
Just as the personal relationships between Soviet and American leaders grew stronger as a 
result of the US summit, Pravda’s coverage of Soviet-American relations received another 
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shot in the arm with Brezhnev’s visit to the United States.  Preceding his visit, Pravda
printed an article by academic A. Vinograd and Deputy Chairman of the Government 
Committee of the Ministry for Science and Technology D. Gvishiani.  Addressing the 
importance of developing economic relations between the countries, they write, “Examining 
in this light the contacts of the USSR and the USA, one cannot fail to note that the change in
relations between the two governments, outlined as a result of the Moscow meeting in May 
1972, laid the foundations for the development of cooperation in the fields of science and 
technology.”68  In anticipation of the summit, Pravda printed two articles on June 16.  One 
provides Nixon’s announcement of Brezhnev’s visit, and the other asserts that both
Republican and Democratic senators looked forward to the summit and the furthering of 
détente.  Nixon mentioned the great progress made in the previous year and his hope to 
“expand even more these relations during the vitally important meetings in the coming 
week,” while one senator explained his certainty that “the results of this visit will be real 
progress in the improvement of relations between the USSR and the USA and the furthering 
of détente.”69 Like the period preceding the Moscow summit, Pravda focused on the positive 
aspects of American foreign policy before the beginning of the US summit.
Following Brezhnev’s arrival in the United States, Pravda adopted a style of coverage
similar to its treatment of the US during the Moscow summit. The newspaper removed all 
negative references to American foreign policy, instead including reports of Brezhnev’s visit 
in fine detail.  Authors of newspaper articles outlined the many different ways that stronger 
Soviet-American relations could improve the world.  For instance, in “Cooperation Serves 
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Peace,” the Soviet Minister of Public Health writes of the first parallel studies of viruses in 
the USA and the USSR: “We need to hope that cooperation with the USA as well as with the 
leading firms of other countries will contribute to raising the level of medical technology, 
necessary for our clinics and scientific establishments.”70 Also, in the June 17 edition, 
Pravda quotes artist I. A. Monseev: “The expansion of contacts and the mutually-enriching 
cooperation of the workers of art of the USSR and the USA . . . contributes to the 
strengthening of mutual understanding, peace, and friendship between the peoples of our 
countries for the good of humanity.”71  Additionally, the newspaper printed the speeches of 
Nixon and Brezhnev side by side, noting that the speeches were “listened to with 
considerable attention and greeted with applause.”72 And, once again, the newspaper listed
new agreements between the two superpowers nearly every day, most often on the front 
page.  Finally, near the end of his visit, Brezhnev gave a televised speech, which Pravda 
reprinted in full.  The general secretary declared: “I heard that in the American political 
lexicon there is an expression ‘to win the peace.’  I think that the present historical moment 
perhaps appears to be most suitable for the use of this expression.  Together we won the
[Second World] War.  Today our joint efforts must help humanity win a durable peace.  The 
possibility of a new war must be eliminated.”73  In this way, Brezhnev provided a positive 
assessment of Soviet-American relations, highlighting the cooperative defeat of the Nazis in 
World War II and the success of the summits in Moscow and the US, while pointing to the 
need to continue expanding and strengthening détente.  
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Once again, political cartoons during the visit ignore America but criticize other Western 
countries’ foreign policies.  For instance, a Pravda cartoon “The Fox and the Grapes” 
featured a fox dressed as an Israeli soldier attempting to take a bite from a bundle of grapes, 
which is shaped and labeled as “Africa.”74  Another anti-Israeli cartoon came on June 21, 
“The Face of the Aggressor.”  In this cartoon, the nose of an Israeli  soldier, appearing as a
smoking cannon, reads “Provocation” and stretches far across a fence, which represents the 
Lebanese border.75 In addition to presenting anti-Semitic caricatures, both of these cartoons 
avoid criticism of America, Israeli’s primary ally, instead directing the blame away from the 
US government in the spirit of the talks.  Finally, “The Bonanza” appeared in Pravda shortly 
after Brezhnev left the United States.  This cartoon features a man in a dark suit and an 
African explorer’s hat rolling the southern tip of Africa like a can of sardines.  A second 
man, dressed in typical capitalist garb, reaches into the continent to plunder its goods.  The 
caption warns that “monopolies acquire enormous capital” in the “merciless exploitation of 
human and natural resources” in Africa.76  Overall, like the cartoons that appeared during 
Nixon’s visit to Moscow, these provide a criticism of Western foreign policy and capitalism 
in general, avoiding critiques of American foreign policy.
As détente continued to build in the summer of 1973, Pravda followed suit.  Glowing
reviews of Soviet-American cooperation and détente in both the articles and the cartoons 
once again characterized Pravda during Brezhnev’s visit to the United States, replacing the 
composite view that emerged after the excitement of Nixon’s May 1972 visit died down.
The departure of American troops from Vietnam and the additional agreements signed at the 
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US summit did not push Pravda to focus on the impending victory of communism over 
capitalism; rather, Pravda explored the growth of cooperation between the superpowers with 
feverish optimism, even raising the hope that the threat of conflict with the United States 
could be made a permanent feature of the past.
“Nixon’s Last Friend”: The Watergate Scandal
In the event that Brezhnev truly dreamed that the threat of nuclear conflict could be 
eliminated from the world, as he claimed in his televised address to the US public, his hopes
were soon crushed, as the Watergate scandal began a process that would eventually limit the 
Republican presidential administration’s ability to single-handedly control foreign policy.
While the foundations for a close personal relationship between the leaders of the 
superpowers had been developed during the détente summits and secret negotiations, the 
Watergate scandal ironically managed to bring Nixon and Brezhnev even closer.  As 
Dobrynin outlines in his memoirs, Nixon opened a channel of personal communication about 
Watergate with Brezhnev, who, believing “that the scandal was being used against Nixon by 
opponents of détente,” provided a sympathetic ear, serving as “Nixon’s staunch friend and 
supporter, probably the last he had among the leaders of great nations, including his own.”77
Dobrynin concludes: 
The irony of the situation was that during this period Nixon seemed to be as frank, 
direct, and even cynical in conversations with his old communist enemies as he was 
with friends, if not more so.  I think the old cold warrior finally became friendlier 
toward the Soviet Union in the deepening Watergate isolation.  The good personal 
contacts and deepening relationship he developed with Brezhnev also helped.  After all, 
we are all human.78
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Therefore, during the Watergate crisis, the leadership of both superpowers viewed closer 
relations as an important political move.  While Nixon sought greater support from abroad as 
a means to counterbalance his increased “isolation” at home, Brezhnev drew closer to the 
president in an effort to preserve Soviet gains in détente, fearful that American opponents of 
détente were using the crisis to stop SALT II negotiations and to rekindle the Cold War, 
which would discredit Brezhnev’s approach to foreign policy at home, weakening his claims 
to legitimacy and necessitating higher defense spending that the Soviet Union could not 
afford.  By August 9, 1974, when Nixon resigned in order to avoid impeachment, his 
relationship with Brezhnev was as close as it had ever been.
Pravda’s presentation of the Watergate affair to the Soviet public parallels Dobrynin’s 
description of the Soviet leadership’s personal feelings.  Prior to Nixon’s resignation, the 
press coverage featured no attacks on Nixon or the White House leadership.  During the late 
spring and early summer of 1974, when the American press put more and more emphasis on 
Nixon’s role in Watergate, Pravda downplayed the scandal, focusing on other issues.  For 
instance, the press kept a spotlight on Nixon’s second visit to Moscow in June 1974, which 
historian Fraser J. Harbutt describes simply as a “third showy summit spectacular” organized 
by the Soviets to help the president counter the crumbling of his image in the US.79 On July 
5, Pravda wrote positively of the summit, summarizing a Nixon speech: “The agreements
concluded during these negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. . . . 
make an important contribution to the building of peace that we are attempting to erect in 
relations between our two countries and on the whole planet.”80 Moreover, on August 6, 
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three days before Nixon’s resignation, Pravda outlined the accomplishments of détente since 
the first Moscow summit, concluding: “Wide circles of the world public give high marks to 
the work accomplished during the negotiations.  The third Soviet-American summit assigned 
a new practical impulse to the process of universal détente, began an important stage in the 
cause of eliminating the danger of war and improving the international political climate on 
the whole.”81 By continuing to cover the summit in July, the article describes the positive 
accomplishments of Nixon and Brezhnev in détente, ignoring the Watergate scandal and 
rendering support for the American president.
Another way the newspaper deflected attention from the Watergate scandal was by 
concentrating on other scandals around the world and problems on the American homefront.  
Reporting on one of the crises deemed worthy of discussion in Pravda in 1974, Author V. 
Drobkov wrote an article on an Italian “Mail Scandal” five days before the resignation of 
Nixon, covering one of the few scandals deemed worthy of discussion in Pravda in 1974.  In 
the article, Drobkov described how “entire trains, millions of letters did not reach their 
addresses in recent years because of the disorder reigning over the Italian mail.”82 Regarding 
the United States, coverage shifted away from scandals to other crises.  On July 30, Pravda
noted that “vast areas of the central part of the USA have been stricken by a terrible drought, 
the most severe of the past forty years.”83 Furthermore, in the subtitle of an article printed 
three days before Nixon’s resignation, Pravda provided a quotation from Secretary of the 
Treasury William Simon and declared, “Inflation – problem number one for the USA.”84
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Even in the days prior to the end of Nixon’s presidency, the Soviet press shifted attention 
away from Watergate, instead focusing on other international scandals or other domestic 
issues faced by the American government.
While articles on the successes of détente or the other world crises dominated Pravda’s 
international news during Watergate, when the newspaper actually addressed Watergate, it 
did so in a manner that assured its readership that the scandal would not negatively affect 
détente.  One article from July 29 notes: “The Judiciary Committee of the House of 
Representatives . . . approved the first article of resolution, recommending that the House of 
Representatives vote to impeach.  In this resolution, they indict the president in connection 
with the investigation referred to as the Watergate affair.”  The article concludes, however, 
by allowing Nixon to emphasize his innocence.  It states, “In the words of a White House 
representative, President R. Nixon is confident of the fact that the House of 
Representatives . . . will not vote on impeachment, as there is no basis for that.”85 Also, on 
August 3, after reporting that the House “came to a preliminary agreement to begin debate on 
the question of impeachment of the president on August 19,” Pravda defends the president:
“A representative of the White House again announced that the president is confident of the 
fact that if the members of the House of Representatives carefully and impartially weigh the 
facts, they will come to the conclusion that the charges advanced by the commission do not 
hold up.”86  In the few instances that Pravda openly discussed Watergate, including both of 
these articles, writers began with the impeachment proceedings and concluded with Nixon’s 
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statements, giving the embattled president of détente the final word in pronouncing his own 
innocence.
The political cartoons that appeared during the Watergate era share in this effort to divert 
attention away from the scandal.  One cartoon, entitled “Mars: the guard they pecked to 
death!,” depicts a large dove, with a body shaped like the globe and wings formed from the 
word “détente,” chasing a small figure of Mars, the Roman god of war.87  Here, rather than 
focusing on the political difficulties encountered by their negotiating partner, the Soviet 
newspaper assigns the accomplishments of détente to center stage, as the relaxation of 
tensions between the superpowers allows the dove, a symbol of peace, to take off in flight 
and attack the small, insignificant specter of war.  Another example of a cartoon providing 
implicit support for President Nixon comes on July 30, with “Peking fashions in the Western 
world.”  In an unusual twist, the cartoon provides caricatures of current politicians, including 
British conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, head of the Bavarian Christian Socialist 
Union Franz Josef Strauss, and Nixon and détente critic, US Senator Henry Jackson, who is 
given the nickname “Hawk” in the cartoon’s caption.  Each of the characters is dressed in 
Chinese clothing, with Heath wearing a vest that reads “Tory,” Strauss wearing a belt that 
reads “Revenge” and holding a fan with his party’s initials on it, and Jackson holding cards 
depicting missiles that collectively read “anti-Soviet.”88  While this cartoon lends insight into 
the tense nature of Sino-Soviet relations in 1974, it also provides an instance of Soviet 
newspapers directly criticizing Jackson, a proponent of Nixon’s impeachment and an enemy 
of detente, during the Watergate affair.  Rather than standing on the sidelines or even taking 
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an opportunity to employ a Marxist-Leninist attack on Watergate as an example of corrupt 
bourgeois government, Soviet newspapers actively highlighted what they saw as the positive 
aspects of Nixon’s presidency, especially détente, while downplaying Watergate.  This stance 
reflected the growing relations between the Soviet and American leadership circles as well as 
the Soviet government’s desire to preserve the credibility of détente among their home 
populace despite the difficulties encountered by their American negotiating partner.
Once President Nixon’s resignation became imminent, Pravda continued with an all-out 
defense of détente, assuring its readers that the policies pursued by the two governments 
would carry on indefinitely.  The first article to signal Nixon’s future, “Toward the 
Resignation of R. Nixon,” came on August 9, with House Minority Leader John Rhodes 
stating that “the president will announce his resignation in his address” to the nation.  This 
article is careful to conclude, however, with two reassurances for the preservation of détente, 
regardless of the president’s resignation.  It quotes Kissinger, who “indicated that ‘not one 
foreign government should experience any doubts concerning the conduct of our foreign 
policy,’” before continuing with Democratic Senate Majority Leader Michael Mansfield’s 
assertion that he still would “work in the interests of the guarantee of two -party support of 
the present international course, above all détente in relations with the Soviet Union.”89
Another editorial spread from that day, which condemns the forces of anticommunism while 
praising détente, concludes with a quote from Brezhnev: 
We are convinced of the correctness of our path, our Marxist-Leninist ideology, and 
do not doubt that naturally, under the conditions of détente, the widening of contacts, the 
exchange of spiritual values, information, the development of ties between the peoples 
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of different countries well serves the spread of the truth about socialism, the winning of 
more and more new supporters to the cause of scientific communism.90
Therefore, in the day before the official declaration of Nixon’s resignation, the Pravda staff 
prepared its readers for the announcement, hinting at the resignation, emphasizing the gains 
of détente over the previous two years, and stating its shared conviction with the US 
government that, regardless of President Nixon’s decision, the two superpowers would not 
deviate from the path of détente.  Additionally, while these statements demonstrate 
confidence in the future of Marxist-Leninism, they do not do so in the aggressive manner 
described by Gilbert.  Instead of explicitly discussing the imminent victory of communism, 
they vaguely suggest that future international cooperation will facilitate greater 
understanding and acceptance of socialism by people throughout the world, allowing new 
constituents to accept the superiority of the ideology.      
The next day, the paper announced Nixon’s resignation and Ford’s rise to the presidency, 
assuring its readers about the future of détente. In its short, seven-sentence biography of 
Ford, Pravda provides Ford’s stance on détente, exclaiming, “In his address, G. Ford stated 
his opinion in support of the policy of the normalization of Soviet-American relations and 
favorably appraised the results of the Soviet-American summits.”91 Later in this edition of 
the newspaper, after a statement of Nixon’s belief that the US “should develop and widen 
these new relations” of détente, a Pravda correspondent tells his readers, “All American 
newspapers are publishing the statement of G. Ford, explicitly giving his word that as
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president of the USA he will continue the policy of achieving a secure peace.”92  A final 
article from the August 10 edition of Pravda assures the newspaper’s readers that “an 
overwhelming majority of Americans approve of the foreign policy directed toward the 
search for paths of further improvement of Soviet-American relations and the relaxation of 
international tensions.”93 In sum, Pravda’s positive presentation of détente survived the 
Watergate affair, as the Soviet leadership sought to continue to encourage détente despite the 
changing of the presidency. Owing to Brezhnev’s personal interest in maintaining the public 
legitimacy of his foreign policy choices as well as his refusal to abandon Nixon in private, 
Pravda did not publish an ideological condemnation of the American leader for public 
consumption, instead choosing to limit coverage of Watergate, defend Nixon and his 
policies, and assure its readership that regardless of political change in the US, détente would 
continue uninterrupted.   
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Détente in Crisis: The Jackson-Vanik Amendment
With the Watergate scandal discrediting unrestricted executive authority, a resurgent
Democratic majority in the Senate, emboldened by the Watergate scandal, sought a means to 
reclaim a role in foreign policy, now totally dominated by Kissinger.  Congress made its 
move with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Bill, which stipulated that the 
Soviet Union needed to free conditions for the emigration of Jews from the USSR to Israel in 
order to receive most-favored-nation (MFN) status.  This not only perturbed Moscow, as the 
Soviets attempted to hold back immigration in order to prevent a “brain drain” resulting from 
the emigration of unhappy dissidents and to maintain order in the authoritarian country, but 
also cramped Kissinger, who did not personally feel that a nation’s treatment of its citizens 
should affect its “legitimacy” on the international scene.  Moreover, Kissinger could no 
longer claim to his negotiating partners that he had free reign in brokering deals, and his 
ability to effectively back up his words with actions became questioned by the parties he 
dealt with.  
Kissinger expressed this frustration in a meeting with his staff of State Department Soviet 
experts, stating: “But what bothers me about all of this is that the Soviets are getting nothing 
out of détente.  We are pushing them everywhere and what can I deliver in Moscow?”94
Vowing to “have a public brawl” with Senator Henry Jackson, the primary sponsor of the 
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Trade Bill amendment, he continued, “The same sons of bitches who drove us out of 
Vietnam and said it would be immoral for us to tamper with the North Vietnamese internal 
system now try to destroy détente and assert that it’s our moral obligation to change internal 
Soviet policies.”95  He concluded his venting, stating: “Every stinking, God damned 
bureaucrat in this town has reservations about cooperation with the Russians.  I am not 
asking about their reservations.”  He repeated, “I am not asking about their reservations.  I 
am asking what they can do.”96  Increasingly surrounded by unfriendly bureaucrats and 
politicians who hoped to cripple his ability to negotiate unilaterally, Kissinger was left to 
pursue his policies of détente in a world that became less friendly to his work every day.
These restraints on Kissinger’s foreign policy exceeded private frustrations to color 
diplomatic conversations between Kissinger and Brezhnev in 1974.  Although a meeting on 
March 25, 1974, began with the usual pleasantries, with Kissinger joking about how 
Brezhnev’s cigarette holder looked like a MIRV,97 the initial cracks soon appeared in 
détente’s armor.  Brezhnev first discussed the “good foundation” that they had laid, 
promising that he would “not now speak of those who want to shake or destroy that 
foundation” and emphasizing his belief that “when those people become more mature they 
will apologize to their own people for the harm they are trying to do.”  He later added: “I 
have never seen President Nixon disappointed with what we have done.  Only [Senator] 
95
 Ibid, 225.
96
 Ibid, 227-28.  
97
 “Kissinger-Brezhnev Conversation, 25 March 1974, 11:05 AM – 1:57 PM,” in The Kissinger Transcripts, 
ed. William Burr (New York: The New Press, 1999), 232.  MIRV stands for “Multiple Independently 
Targetable Reentry Vehicles.”  A MIRVed missile carries several nuclear warheads, making it able to 
simultaneously hit several targets.  
47
Jackson. . . .  And he is not America.”98  At this point, however, the two men could still joke 
about the matter.  This is seen two days later, when Brezhnev discussed his fears of the 
growing sentiment in America that the US needed to build a larger nuclear arsenal as a 
display of strength.  The general secretary stood up, imitating the gestures of a campaigning 
politician, stating that if he gave a campaign speech and called for the Soviet Union to 
become stronger than America, “the military men [would] say, ‘Give us the money.’”  
Kissinger laughed, “If you said that, Senator Jackson would give you wide publicity in 
America.”  Amused over the number of times the senator had come up, Brezhnev exclaimed, 
“Senator Jackson again!”99
But the Jackson-Vanik Amendment would not last as a laughing matter for long.  In a 
meeting on October 24, only seven months later, Brezhnev aggressively attacked the 
American approach to détente.  Regarding most favored nation status, Brezhnev lectured: 
Everything was agreed and crystal clear two and one-half years ago.  Yet we do not 
see any part of that agreement fulfilled.  Several days ago, I read that the United States 
had decided to accord MFN to several countries including China.  But, regarding the 
Soviet Union, MFN would be accorded only as a special favor and only for 18 months.  
Let me say frankly that we cannot accept that ‘gift’ (hits table with hand).  We see it as a 
discriminatory practice that we cannot agree to.  I wish to emphasize that! 100
Brezhnev loudly complained about many facets of American foreign policy, including 
conflicts in the Middle East, cancelled contracts in grain sales, and restricted access of Soviet 
business representatives to American factories, but he soon returned to the trade bill and a 
series of letters between Jackson and Kissinger that discussed a Soviet promise to allow 
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60,000 Jews to emigrate from the USSR to Israel.  After asserting that “the Soviet Union has 
not given an obligation in terms of numbers,” Brezhnev concluded: “You know that the 
Soviet Union has not given an obligation in terms of numbers.  We have said we would not 
erect barriers; we are not. . . . The import of this is that Jackson has won a great victory over 
the White House and that he has managed to extract certain concessions from the Soviet 
Union.”  Kissinger, left speechless, simply said, “What burns me up is that a lot of what the 
General Secretary has said is true.”101
When given the opportunity to speak at length, Kissinger defended his policies.  He 
explained that his relationship with the new president, Gerald Ford, was “at least as close as 
that with his predecessor.”  He went on to assure Brezhnev that he and Ford were “both 
determined as soon as the election is over to have a showdown with the Congress on who 
controls foreign policy.”102  Later, the issue of MFN drove Kissinger into a frenzy.  He 
stated: “[Senator Jackson’s] manner is as humiliating for me as it is for you (hits table with 
hand).  The press is saying that Kissinger has been defeated by Jackson.  I’m as angry as you 
are.”  Following this tirade, Kissinger left the room for three minutes, and when he returned, 
he had regained his composure, joking in his response that Gromyko’s proposal for a lunch 
break was “ending this discussion in the middle of [his] most eloquent speech.”103  Despite 
the resuming of jokes and Brezhnev’s January 1976 assessment that “in spite of all the 
complexities that exist, our two countries have succeeded in consolidating the line of détente 
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and the line of improvement of US-Soviet relations,” 104 a permanent scar had formed over 
détente, as Kissinger’s limitations as secretary of state rendering him incapable of effectively 
managing his system of diplomacy.  With Kissinger now working in a secretarial position 
instead of as a presidential advisor, opening him to congressional oversight, Kissinger could 
no longer secretly pursue negotiations through back channels.  Moreover, with Congress 
inserting moral concerns into détente through the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and 
Kissinger’s promises to the Soviets to link only economic benefits to détente foiled, 
Kissinger seemed less credible to his Soviet negotiating partners, making personal appeals to 
the Soviet leadership far less effective.105  In sum, Congress, reacting to the Watergate 
scandal, struck at the very heart of Kissinger’s negotiating strategy by passing the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment, discouraging Soviet policymakers and permanently stalling détente.
The composite image of the US continues with Ford’s signing of the trade bill with the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment into law on January 3, 1975, leading Pravda to present the US as
both a friend in détente and a nation that unfairly discriminated in its trade agreements, 
thereby maiming any potential for mutual cooperation.  The day that Ford signed the bill, 
Pravda placed a quote on the front page from a London journal, which supported the work 
done at the fourth Soviet-American summit in Vladivostok the previous month, where Ford 
and Brezhnev agreed upon the preliminary outlines of the SALT II agreement.106  The article 
reads, “The Soviet-American agreement reached in Vladivostok presents a concrete program 
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of cooperation between the two countries for the coming years.”107 Moreover, the press 
continued presenting Ford’s efforts for détente in a personal and positive light, similar to the 
way that it approached the work of Nixon.  On January 25, 1975, Pravda wrote that “Ford 
supported the continuation and expansion of détente and the improvement of Soviet-
American relations” and that Ford discussed “the excellent opportunity to make a 
contribution to the strengthening of the matter of peace throughout the world.”108  In this 
way, the newspaper’s approach to détente after the fall of Nixon and the approval of the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment remains similar to the way it had been portrayed since Nixon’s 
visit to Moscow in May 1972, with the positive descriptions of negotiations and the personal 
view of American foreign policy.
Despite this positive coverage, Pravda provided readers with an impersonal and negative 
portrayal of American economic policy, owing to the Jackson -Vanik Amendment.  Pravda
describes this act to the Soviet public as “discrimination in trade,” as the government 
attempted to retain its legitimacy by avoiding the issue of emigration in its public discourse 
while remaining critical of the restrictions imposed by the amendment.  Therefore, Pravda 
asserts, “As is well-known, the Congress of the USA, during the approval of this bill, 
introduced into it some discriminatory provisos and limitations, which concern Soviet-
American trade.”109 Similar to previous instances of negative coverage, criticism is not 
applied to specific American leaders, and the newspaper instead targets the impersonal force 
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of Congress.  Later in the month, in an article “Against Discrimination in Trade,” Pravda
inserted opinions from several foreign presses, including India, where it was written that “the 
law about trade, which was accepted in the USA, is in sharp contradiction with the sprit of 
détente.”110 Here, Pravda incorporates voices from around the globe to provide its readers 
with the impression that the rest of the world sided with the Soviet Union, condemning 
American economic policy as a means for aggressively anti-Soviet forces in the US, 
portrayed in an impersonal light, to limit détente.  The newspaper presents the trade bill as 
blocking the path to the achievement of peace in the world similar to the way that it 
represented the Vietnam War earlier, with a negative but impersonal critique of American 
policy.
The conflict in détente caused by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment also finds reflection in 
the political cartoons of the era.  On the one hand, some cartoons praise the accomplishments 
of détente, including “The Peaceful Co-existence of Two Separate Systems.”  This cartoon 
from July 1975 celebrates the Apollo-Soyuz mission, which featured an American spacecraft 
and a Soviet spacecraft docking together in what became the first manned international space 
mission.111  The cartoon shows the two spacecraft docked together above the planet, with 
astronauts from each side standing on their respective ships and holding flags that meet to 
form the “” in “,” which means “peace.”112  This cartoon stresses the positive 
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attributes of détente, highlighting the great accomplishments the two superpowers could
achieve when working together for peace.
On the other hand, some cartoons criticize the economic restraints that the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment placed on détente.  For example, in the cartoon “As You See, We Try to 
SUPPORT Détente,” a sign marked “Cooperation” points down a road.  Blocking the path, 
however, are three men in suits, assembling a wooden barricade.  While the man in the 
middle, wearing a dark suit and a sinister grin, presents the crossbar to the barrier, which 
reads, “We are for détente,” his two henchmen stand on the ends of the main beam, 
hammering together the supporting beams, which read “provisos” and “amendments.”113
This cartoon demonstrates the Soviet government’s frustrations with the economic policies of 
Congress, presenting them as a roadblock to détente set up by devious politicians who claim 
to support the policies of cooperation.
With the enactment of the Trade Bill and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment on January 3,
1975, détente became crippled, as Kissinger could no longer effectively back up the promises 
he gave to his negotiating partners, destroying his accountability.  Once again, the public 
presentation of the US occurred on two different levels, with a negative and impersonal 
portrayal of the trade bill and a positive and personal presentation of détente.   
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Conclusion
On November 2, 1976, Gerald Ford lost the presidential election to Democrat Jimmy 
Carter.  Ford became a lame-duck president, and Henry Kissinger no longer was the guiding 
force behind American foreign policy.  The day after the election, Dobrynin offered
Kissinger his condolences.  “I just wanted to say to you that I am going to miss you – in the 
future, I mean.”  Promising to “stand outside the government for what [he] stood for inside,” 
Kissinger responded, “I will miss you, too.  If it is possible to have a Marxist friend. . . . ”
After lamenting that the completion of a SALT II agreement probably “would have changed 
the outcome” of the election, the primary negotiators of the back channel diplomacy hung up 
their phones and went their separate ways.114 The election of Carter brought a serious 
decline in the prospects for détente, and by June 1978, Brezhnev grimly declared in a speech 
to the Politburo that “a serious deterioration and exacerbation of the situation has occurred,” 
with Carter apparently “intent upon struggling for his election to a new term as President of 
the USA under the banner of anti-Soviet policy and a return to the ‘cold war.’”115  Therefore, 
with the end of Kissinger’s tenure in the State Department in 1977, the personal tone of 
negotiations changed dramatically, and détente was stalled.
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The personal diplomacy of the superpower rivals during détente proved important in both 
shaping superpower foreign policy and giving the leaders an important tool to use in pursuing 
their foreign policy agendas.  It helped Kissinger to gain Brezhnev’s trust at the Moscow 
guest house on the eve of Nixon’s visit.  It allowed Dobrynin to delay the Soviet decision on 
whether or not to hold the Moscow summit in light of the continuation of Operation 
Linebacker.  It made Brezhnev Nixon’s last friend during the Watergate scandal, as both 
leaders hoped to preserve their own legitimacy by holding onto the successes of détente.  
And it gave both superpowers a means to negotiate their way out of the nuclear crisis that 
came with the October War.
In tracing the history of this personal diplomacy of détente, I have examined the major 
turning points of Soviet coverage of détente in Pravda, seeking to understand how this major 
Soviet newspaper adjusted its coverage to correspond with changes in the international scene.  
What I have discovered confirms Schwartz’s findings that Soviet views on American foreign 
policy motives became much more complex during the Nixon era, especially after the 1972 
Moscow summit.  Indeed, the United States could no longer simply be discounted as a 
constant foe operating by one set of rules of capitalist imperialism.  Now, individuals such as 
Nixon, Ford, Kissinger, or even members of Congress emerged to shape policy
independently, while entities that previously would have been defined monolithically, such 
as Congress, broke into different factions supporting or hindering détente.  
My analysis departs with Schwartz’s work, however, by providing new insight into how 
the Soviet government attempted to alter the public’s attitudes on a day-to-day basis.  Here, 
we see how a cautious Soviet government did not leak news of warming relations with the 
US until five days before Nixon’s arrival to sign the SALT agreements.  Once his visit was 
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officially confirmed, however, the tone of the press changed immediately, as the government 
signaled to its people that relations with the US were about to dramatically improve.  This is 
also seen in the paper’s handling of the Watergate affair, as the government carefully 
managed the scandal’s portrayal in the press to preserve the credibility of its support for 
détente, in spite of a presidential scandal that started the demise of détente in the US.  Press 
coverage of the United States could be multilayered, as was demonstrated between the 
summits, with a mixture of condemnation of American participation in Vietnam and 
excitement for détente, and when the Jackson-Vanik Amendment took hold, with further 
excitement for détente but negative coverage for what Pravda dubbed “discrimination in 
trade.”  While public response to these changing images cannot be easily ascertained, it can
be assumed that they caught the Soviet people by surprise.  Pravda suddenly stopped 
imparting a static, negative image American foreign policy to the Soviet people prior to the 
Moscow summit.  At that point, it offered coverage that was more dynamic, with a portrayal 
of an American government that functioned on several layers.
Similar to the diplomatic scene, where Kissinger and Brezhnev’s personal approach to 
relations played a key role in melting the ice of the Cold War, the presentation of individuals
proved important in shifting newspaper coverage of the United States.  Pravda’s authors
skillfully wove the personalities of Nixon, Ford, and other foreign policy leaders into the 
narrative of détente to differentiate the positive attributes of US foreign policy from their 
impersonal and negative portrayals of US policy in the Third World or the “economic 
discrimination” of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.
Finally, while some of Pravda’s more radical statements, such as its optimism that the 
superpowers could secure an everlasting world peace, come off as mere propaganda, the pre-
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summit negative and impersonal portrayals of American policy in Vietnam reflect the Soviet 
government’s early apprehension about Nixon and détente.  Even though the back channel 
negotiations had not yet yielded concrete agreements, the decision to wait patiently to see 
how the new situation would unfold is evident in the lack of personal attacks on Nixon, 
Kissinger, or the other American foreign policy leaders responsible for détente.  The 
explosion in the positive, personality-driven coverage of détente during the Moscow summit 
indicates the Soviet leaders’ growth in confidence in cooperation, paralleling Dobrynin’s 
assertion that the Soviet government was apprehensive about détente until the superpowers 
publicly agreed upon concrete measures.  The formation of the composite view in the 
following months reflects the continued enthusiasm for détente among the Soviet leadership, 
even as Vietnam remained a thorn in the side of negotiations.  The optimism grew in the 
months following the announcement of American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973.  
Pravda’s tone reached a feverishly optimistic pitch during the 1973 US summit before the 
newspaper defended Nixon during the Watergate scandal in response to Brezhnev’s personal 
feelings toward Nixon as well as a need to defend the legitimacy of détente, a process that 
had become associated with Brezhnev in the previous years.  The composite view of 
American foreign policy returned with the passing of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 
1974 Trade Bill, indicating persistent hopes for the continuation of détente, but also a 
realization that its progress might now be limited by new fact ions within the American 
government.  Therefore, even without transcriptions of Politburo meetings, it is evident that 
once détente was established, the Soviet government saw it as the new centerpiece for its
worldview, which is reflected in both the diplomatic exchanges with Kissinger and the 
newspapers presented to the public.  
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